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Abstract 
Congenital Prosopagnosia and inability to experience visual imagery was investigated 
through administration of neuropsychological, face processing and visual imagery tests 
on a single patient, JP. JP had no general intellectual impairment, no problems affecting 
visual and spatial abilities and had little problems affecting overall memory. She was 
impaired on unfamiliar face matching, perception of eye gaze and famous face 
recognition, and was in the normal range for facial expression recognition; thus 
suggesting that JP is of the “prosopagnosic” type. Subjective vividness and spontaneous 
use of imagery was rated as extremely poor and performance of standard tests of visual 
imagery yielded mixed results. These findings were interpreted as suggesting that JP 
adopted different cognitive strategies when performing imagery tasks 
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Introduction 
 
Face Processing 
“Faces are among the most important visual stimuli we perceive, informing us not 
only about a person‟s identity, but also about their mood, sex, age and direction of gaze” 
(Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006, p. 2109). Whether the multiple cognitive components 
involved in the perception and processing of faces rely on domain-specific or domain-
general mechanisms has been the cause of great debate throughout the history of 
cognitive neuroscience. On one hand, is the view that that the mechanisms engaged by 
faces are not specific for a particular stimulus class (i.e. faces), but for a particular 
process that may run on multiple stimulus classes (Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006). On the 
other hand, the face-specificity hypothesis suggests that humans have specialized 
cognitive and neural mechanisms dedicated to the perception of faces that are not 
recruited for the perception of other stimuli. 
There is considerable behavioural and neuropsychological evidence in favour of 
the face-specificity hypothesis. Firstly, Farah (2000) argues that given that face and 
object recognition are mutually independent systems localised in different brain regions, 
it stands to reason that they are two separate systems. This statement is further 
supported by findings that the two systems can be individuated according to their 
information processing functions (Farah, 2000). Furthermore, Duchaine, Yovel, 
Butterworth and Nakayama, (2006) found support for the notion that face recognition is 
carried out by face-specific mechanisms by assessing the recognition abilities of an 
individual with lifelong face recognition impairments (Edward). Edward was found to 
have impairments with many types of face processing ability (identity, emotions, gender, 
attractiveness), yet performance of non-face recognition tests was normal. Edward‟s 
face specific impairment indicated to the researchers that he had failed to develop face-
specific mechanisms yet was able to develop normal object recognition mechanisms. 
Thus it was concluded that “face and non-face mechanisms are created, at least in part, 
by different developmental processes” (Duchaine et al., 2006, p.30).  
A functional model of face processing was proposed by Bruce and Young (1986) 
to account for the multiple cognitive components involved in the perception and 
processing of faces. The model suggests that there are separate pathways for the 
processing of facial expressions, the directed visual analysis required to match 
unfamiliar faces, facial speech, and the recognition of familiar faces. According to the 
model, structural encoding processes provide descriptions suitable for the analysis of 
expression and facial speech, directed visual processing and for face recognition units. 
Recognition of familiar faces involves a match between the products of structural 
encoding and previously stored structural codes describing the appearance of familiar 
faces (held in face recognition units); identity-specific semantic codes are then accessed 
from person identity nodes, and subsequently name codes are retrieved. It is also 
proposed that the cognitive system plays an active role in deciding whether or not the 
initial match is sufficiently close to indicate true recognition or merely a 'resemblance'; 
several other factors are seen as influencing these decisions (Bruce & Young, 1986). 
According to Haxby, Hoffman and Ida Gobbini, (2000) face processing is carried 
out by a domain-specific circuit; Haxby et al. (2000) suggest that face perception is 
mediated by a distributed neural system that is comprised of multiple, bilateral regions. 
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A model for the organization of this system was put forward that emphasises a 
distinction between the representation of invariant and changeable aspects of faces; 
according to the model the representation of invariant aspects of faces underlies the 
recognition of individuals, whereas the representation of changeable aspects of faces, 
such as eye gaze, expression, and lip movement, underlies the perception of 
information that facilitates social communication. Thus the model is divided into a core 
system and an extended system. The core system consists of three bilateral regions in 
the occipitotemporal visual extrastriate cortex, specifically in the inferior occipital gyri, 
the lateral fusiform gyrus, and the superior temporal sulcus (the fusiform gyrus, 
specifically the fusiform face area (FFA) is the most robust of the three face-selective 
regions (Kanwisher et al. 1997; Yovel & Kanwisher 2004)). The model proposes that 
these regions perform the visual analysis of faces and participate differentially according 
to the type of face perception, for example, the region in the lateral fusiform gyrus is 
thought to be involved more in the representation of identity, whereas the region in the 
superior temporal sulcus is thought to be involved more in the representation of 
changeable aspects of faces (Haxby et al., 2000). The extended system (in anterior 
temporal and frontal cortices) is comprised of regions from neural systems for other 
cognitive functions that can be recruited to work with the regions in the core system to 
extract meaning from faces. The network model of face perception supports the 
cognitive model of face processing as it also emphasises a distinction between 
processes involved in the recognition of identity and those involved in the recognition of 
expression and speech-related movements of the mouth. Further support for the 
network model comes from the fact that a variety of anatomical lesions have been 
described in Prosopagnosia, a “neurological deficit characterized by an inability to 
recognise faces despite intact intellectual and cognitive function and spared visual 
processing” (Steeves, Culhama, Duchaine, Pratesi, Valyear, Schindler, Humphrey, 
Milner & Goodale, 2006, p. 594). For example, although Prosopagnosia is normally 
associated with lesions in ventral occipitotemporal cortex that are usually bilateral 
(Damasio, Damasio & Vanhoesen, 1982) there have been cases reported that suggest 
that Prosopagnosia may result from right occipito-temporal damage (De Renzi, 1986).  
 
Visual Mental Imagery 
Visual mental imagery, that is, “the faculty whereby we can revisualise a visual 
item from memory” (Bartolomeo, 2002, p. 357) is thought to have shared underlying 
mechanisms with visual perception. There is wide support for this notion of 
representational commonality, despite there being some evidence that the two 
processes are dissociated. 
Indeed, neuroimaging studies have revealed that the specific pattern of activation 
during visual imagery is very similar to that found during vision (Gazzangia, 2004). For 
example, a portion of the FFA, which has been found to be more active during viewing 
of faces than viewing of scenes, is also more active during imagining faces than 
imagining scenes; and conversely, a portion of the parahippocampal place area (PPA), 
which has been found to be more active during viewing of scenes than viewing of faces, 
has been found to be more active during imagining scenes than imagining faces 
(O‟Craven & Kanwisher, 2000). Further evidence for this representational commonality 
comes from patients whose imagery and perception deficits affect the same domain 
(Behrmann, Moscovitch & Winocur, 1994). Farah (1984) reviewed the literature on 
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visual agnosias and visual mental imagery and found that of 28 cases of visual agnosia, 
half of the patients had similar visual and visual imagery deficits. It is important to note 
that of the remaining patients, six were not tested for visual imagery and three that had 
seemingly intact visual imagery, underwent no objective tests (e.g. drawing from 
memory) (Gazzainga, 2004). Thus there is considerable neuropsychological and 
behavioural evidence to suggest that the parts of the occipitotemporal areas engaged by 
the different visual attributes and object classes are shared by visual imagery and vision. 
To account for cases that do not evince a parallelism between visual imagery and 
vision, a shared-systems framework has been proposed (Gazzaniga, 2004). This 
framework assumes that visual processes such as object recognition and identification 
rely (in part) on low and mid level visual processes that are not required by visual 
imagery, and that visual imagery involves a separate, attention-demanding process, 
needed for imagery, but not for visual perception and object recognition. “It is these 
intact, higher level processes that…access the stored representations” (Behrmann et al., 
1994, p.1084). The dissociation between the two processes is explained as damage to 
either the low and mid-level processes or the higher-level process, depending on 
whether the patient evinces a visual or imagery deficit. 
 
Prosopagnosia 
Prosopagnosia, i.e. inability to recognise faces, is not a single functional entity but 
a family of disorders (Fox, Iaria & Barton, 2008). The disorder can be divided into two 
broad subtypes: Apperceptive and Associative (De Renzi, Faglioni, Grossi, & Nichelli, 
1991). In Apperceptive Prosopagnosia, the ability to perceive faces is manifestly 
impaired (this would suggest a problem at the structural encoding stage of Bruce & 
Young‟s (1986) model); “the patient is unable to form an accurate perceptual 
representation of the structure of a viewed face” (Fox et al, 2008, p. 996). Whereas in 
Associative Prosopagnosia, face perception appears to function normally, but there is a 
deficit in matching the input to facial memories in order to facilitate recognition. Thus 
Associative Prosopagnosia represents a loss between face perception process and 
semantic information. There are three forms of Prosopagnosia: Acquired, 
Developmental and Congenital. Acquired Prosopagnosia typically results from a 
neurological insult to the ventral visual cortex in premorbidly normal individuals (Thomas 
et al., 2009). Developmental Prosopagnosia is a broad term to describe individuals who 
have sustained brain damage either before birth or in early childhood (Duchaine & 
Nakayama, 2004; Barton et al., 2003; Farah et al., 2000; de Gelder & Rouw, 2000 as 
cited in Behrmann & Avidan, 2005). “There appear to be a number of possible routes to 
Developmental Prosopagnosia; these include genetic conditions, early brain damage, 
and possibly early visual problems such as infantile cataracts or severe myopia” 
(Duchaine et al., 2006, p. 6). Finally, Congenital Prosopagnosia refers to the impairment 
in face processing that is apparent from birth in the absence of any brain damage 
(Behrmann & Avidan, 2005). There are several alternative explanations of 
Prosopagnosia: the face-specific explanation, the individuation explanation, the holistic 
explanation, the configural processing explanation, the curvature explanation and the 
expertise explanation (see Duchaine et al., 1996 for a full review). For the present 
purposes however, the focus will be on Congenital Prosopagnosia.   
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Congenital Prosopagnosia (CP) 
 Congenital Prosopagnosia is a severely debilitating disorder in which individuals 
are disproportionately impaired at face processing in the absence of any brain damage 
or cognitive deficit, and in the absence of a low-level visual processing disorder 
(Behrmann, Avidan, Marotta & Kimchi, 2005). This impairment is apparent from birth. 
The disorder can affect the recognition of the very familiar, for example famous faces, 
friends and family members, and can also affect ability to discriminate between unknown 
faces. This suggests a perceptual, rather than a memorial basis for the deficit 
(Behrmann & Avidan, 2005). Across the literature, CP individuals often report using 
other cues to recognise people, for example voice, clothing, gait, hair, facial hair and 
mannerisms, however, these are often unreliable and can make facial perception worse 
(Tiberghien & Clerc, 1986, as cited in Ellis & Young, 1996). 
According to Duchaine (2000), CP “is caused by a domain-specific inability to 
match novel views of faces with previously derived representations” (Duchaine, 2000, 
p.79). Duchaine (2000) tested this hypothesis i.e. that CP is the result of a domain-
general impairment in configural processing, in a man with developmental 
Prosopagnosia (BC), and found that despite BC‟s Prosopagnosia, he could perform 
normally on configural processing tasks. This led to the suggestion that Prosopagnosia 
can exist without configural processing deficits. Therefore, Duchaine (2000) suggested 
that “the cause of BC‟s Prosopagnosia is an impairment in mechanisms specialised for 
face recognition” (Duchaine, 2000, p. 82). Support for Duchaine (2000) comes from 
neurological studies, for example those that have investigated the multiple, bilateral 
regions described in the network model of face perception by Haxby et al. (2000). 
Earlier neurological studies revealed that CP is not the result of decreased 
activation or lack of selectivity in ventral occipito-temporal areas (Hasson, Avidan, 
Deouell, Bentin & Malach, 2003; Avidan, Hasson, Malach & Behrmann, 2005). Thus the 
proposition that CP emerges from a disruption in the structural connectivity between the 
nodes of the distributed face-processing network was presented (Behrmann, Avidan, 
Gao & Black, 2007; Thomas, Avidan, Humphreys, Jung, Gao & Behrmann, 2009). 
Behrmann et al. (2007) conducted detailed morphometric and volumetric 
analyses of the occipitotemporal cortex in a group of CP individuals and control 
participants, and found that the CP individuals evinced a larger anterior and posterior 
middle temporal gyrus and a significantly smaller anterior fusiform gyrus. This lead to 
the proposition that reduced cortical volume in the anterior regions of the fusiform gyrus 
may result in failure to compute more fine-grained representations, which can result in 
poor propagation of signal to other areas of the distributed face-processing network, 
causing a deficit in face processing such as that evinced in CP. As well as this, the 
researchers examined the structural connectivity of white matter tracts passing through 
the fusiform gyrus. They found that the volume and fractional anisotropy (FA) of the two 
major tracts, namely the inferior fronto-occipital fasciculus (IFOF) and the inferior 
longitudinal fasciculus (ILF), was smaller and reduced in FA in the CP individuals 
compared to the control participants. (Whether the reduction in the volume of the 
anterior fusiform gyrus is a consequence of this and/or of decreased gray matter volume 
is unclear at this stage (Behrmann et al. (2007)). Taken together, these findings support 
the hypothesis that CP emerges from a disruption in the structural connectivity between 
the nodes of the distributed face-processing network. Further support for the structural 
connectivity disruption hypothesis comes from Thomas et al. (2009). A group of CP 
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individuals and control participants were tested using diffusion tensor imaging and 
tractography, and the researchers found that the CP individuals evinced “a marked 
reduction in the structural integrity of the ILF and IFOF bilaterally across all measures” 
(Thomas et al., 2009, p.29).  This lead to the proposition that CP is the result of “a 
reduction in microstructural integrity of the white-matter tracts along the ventral occipito-
temporal cortex” i.e. that impaired face processing is the result of impaired connectivity 
linking the core regions with the extended regions outlined in the distributed neural 
system for face perception by Haxby et al., (2000). Not only does this study provide an 
explanation of the neural basis of CP, it marks a dramatic breakthrough in our 
understanding of face perception, that is, that white matter fibers in ventral occipto-
temporal cortex support the integrated function of the distributed cortical network that 
subserves normal face processing (Thomas et al., 2009).  
 An alternative explanation for CP is that it is hereditary (Behrmann & Avidan, 
2005; Greuter, Grueter, Bell, Horst, Laskowski, Sperling, Halligan, Ellis & Kennerknecht, 
2007; Kennerknecht, Grueter, Welling, Wentzek, Horst, Edwards & Grueter, 2006).  
According to Kennerknecht et al. (2006), “the segregation pattern of…Prosopagnosia is 
fully compatible with autosomal dominant inheritance” (p.1617) and as such is best 
explained by “the mutation of a single gene” (Greuter et al., 2007, p. 734). There are no 
molecular DNA and linkage studies reported in the literature as of yet, thus, establishing 
the potential candidate genes and their role in the development of neuropsychological 
face perception mechanisms remains as the next step in this line of research (Greuter et 
al., 2007). Such findings would represent a dramatic breakthrough in the way we 
understand human cognition (Behrmann & Avidan, 2005).  
 
 Prosopagnosia and visual imagery 
Levine, Warach and Farah (1985) reported a patient (LH) who, following bilateral 
inferior temporal damage, became prosopagnosic and evinced some degree of object 
agnosia. Levine et al. (1985) found that the preserved and impaired aspects of visual 
imagery paralleled LH‟s visual abilities; LH was impaired at perceiving object identity 
from appearance and describing object appearance from memory (especially faces and 
animals, and colours of objects), but was good at localizing visual stimuli and at 
describing their locations from memory. Thus patient LH supports the claim that visual 
mental imagery activates the same stored representations that are engaged by an 
external stimulus during visual perception. Having said this, there have been reports in 
which face perception and visual imagery for faces have been found to be dissociated. 
For example, Madame D (Bartolomeo, Bachoud-Lévi, De Gelder, Denes, Dalla Barba, 
Brugières & Degos, 1998), a patient with bilateral regions in the extrastriate visual areas, 
was found to be profoundly impaired in both overt and covert recognition of familiar 
faces yet had intact ability to consult the configural and computational aspects of faces 
in mental imagery. According to the shared-systems framework, Madame D‟s visual 
deficit and preserved imagery ability can be explained as damage to the low and mid-
level processes and that the processes required by visual imagery are in tact. 
In the current study, an experimental battery composed of various tests 
assessing neuropsychological, face processing and imagery abilities was administered 
in order to assess the face processing and visual imagery abilities of a single patient, 
JP, who reported difficulties with facial recognition and visual imagery. First, a battery of 
tests intended to investigate intellectual, memory and visual perception abilities was 
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administered in order to provide a background context from which to consider any 
impairments affecting face recognition/inability to use visual mental imagery. Second, a 
battery of tests intended to investigate visual and verbal memory, memory and 
recognition of faces and facial expressions and eye gaze perception was carried out to 
investigate the nature and specificity of JPs Prosopagnosia. Finally, a battery of tests 
intended to investigate subjective vividness of visual imagery and imagery abilities was 
administered to investigate JPs reported inability to experience visual imagery. Twenty 
tests were carried out in total. Given JP‟s symptoms, it was predicted that JP would 
perform poorly on tests of face processing and on reports and tests of visual imagery. 
The report will follow a classical neuropsychological model used to report research with 
neurological patients/single-cases to allow for the work carried out with JP to be best 
reflected and reported. 
 
Method 
 
Design 
Congenital Prosopagnosia and inability to experience visual imagery was 
investigated using a single-case experimental design, thus the research focused on a 
single case, JP, rather than a group of participants. 
 
Participants 
 
Case JP 
JP (not actual initials) is a healthy, 45-year-old, right-handed woman. JP 
contacted Senior Clinical Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Plymouth, Dr. Paul 
Broks, reporting difficulties with the recognition of faces and with the experience of 
visual imagery. JP is intelligent, articulate and keen about detail; she claims to have no 
difficulty reading facial expressions of emotion and feels that she is „rather good at 
intuiting other people's states of mind‟ (Broks, 2008). JP uses specific features to identify 
people including hairstyle, shape of eyebrows, facial features such as spots and whether 
one has particularly distinctive features such as “a squashed up nose”. Furthermore, 
clothing, the way people walk and context is also regarded as crucial for identification of 
familiar people.  
 
Control participants 
The performance of JP was compared on relevant measures to that of 20 control 
participants who were matched for sex, age, handedness and IQ. In the instances where 
it was not possible to compare the performance of JP with this control group, control 
data is taken from test norms (see test references for origins of normative data). For 
each test, the nature of control data is explicitly stated. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
The experimental battery was composed of various tests assessing 
neuropsychological, face processing and imagery abilities. All of the tests administered 
are described below;  
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Investigation of neuropsychological abilities 
Handedness based on the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971); 
WAIS-R IQs (full scale, verbal and performance) predicted from the National Adult 
Reading Test (NART) (Nelson, 1982); performance of the Wechsler Memory Scale 
(Third Edition) (Wechsler, 1998) and BIRT Memory and Information Processing Battery 
(Coughlan, Oddy & Crawford, 2007) and assessments of object perception and space 
perception made with the Visual and Object Spatial Perception Battery (VOSP) 
(Warrington, 1991) were investigated. Each of these tests will be described in turn.  
 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
An inventory of 22 items with was given. Participants were instructed to indicate 
their preference in the use of their hands in each of the activities by putting a „+‟ in the 
appropriate column (Left or Right).  
 
NART 
Participants were required to read aloud down a list of 50 words printed in order 
of increasing difficulty and the number of errors made was recorded. The words were 
relatively short in order to avoid the possible adverse effects of stimulus complexity on 
the reading of participants, and they were all „irregular‟ with respect to the common rules 
of pronunciation in order to minimise the possibility of reading by phonemic decoding 
rather than word recognition (Nelson, 1991). WAIS-R full scale, verbal and performance 
IQs were predicted based on the number of errors made.  
 
The Wechsler Memory Scale  III 
To assess working memory, a series of spatial patterns was visually presented on 
a three-dimensional board. For the first task, the examiner pointed to a series of blocks 
at a rate of one block per second, and JP was instructed to point to the same blocks in 
the same order. For the second task, the examiner pointed to a series of blocks, and JP 
was required to point to the same blocks but in the reverse order. Responses were 
recorded. The examiner then read a series of digits aloud and asked JP to say the digits 
in the same order. Next, the examiner read a series of digits aloud and asked JP to say 
them in the reverse order. Responses were recorded.  
 
BIRT Memory and Information Processing Battery 
 A short story comprising 30 ideas was read to JP, who was then required to recall 
it immediately and after a 40-minute delay. Correctly recalled, vaguely or partially 
recalled and incorrect/additional ideas were scored accordingly in both the immediate 
and delayed conditions. JP was then asked to copy a complex a complex two-
dimensional figure and to reproduce it from memory immediately afterwards and after a 
40-minute delay. Correct, clearly recognisable but rotated or misplaced or misaligned or 
disproportionate or incomplete or embellished lines and features were scored 
accordingly in both the immediate and delayed conditions. 
 
Visual and Object Spatial Perception 
To establish adequate shape discrimination the Shape Detection Screening Test 
was administered. The test stimuli were random patterns, on half of which a degraded X 
was superimposed. JP was required to judge whether the X was present or absent. The 
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20 stimulus items were preceded by two practice items, which were used to explain the 
task. A total correct score was recorded, summing the false positive and false negative 
responses. Secondly, the Silhouettes and Progressive Silhouettes tests were 
administered to assess object perception. 15 silhouette drawings of animals and 15 
silhouette drawings of inanimate objects drawn from the outline of each object rotated 
through varying degrees around the lateral axis was presented to JP. The silhouettes in 
each set were arranged in their order of difficulty, ranging from very easy silhouettes to 
difficult silhouettes. The examiner presented the first animal silhouette and informed JP 
that it was a drawing of an animal and that the task was to name it. This procedure was 
repeated for each silhouette. JP was then informed that the next set was all common 
objects and that the task is the same. The total number of silhouettes named (maximum 
= 30) was recorded as the score. JP was then presented with a series of ten silhouettes 
constructed by varying the angle of view from 90 rotation to 0 rotation around the lateral 
axis. The Progressive Silhouettes test consists of two series, a gun and a trumpet. 
These particular objects were selected because no normal subject was able to identify 
the first silhouette in either series, and all normal subjects were able to identify the tenth 
silhouette in both series (Warrington, 1991). The first silhouette was presented and used 
to explain the task: „This is a silhouette drawing of an object and as I turn the pages it 
will get progressively easier to identify‟. Each page was presented in turn and JP was 
asked if she was able to identify the object. The number of trials required to identify each 
object was summed and recorded as the score (maximum trials = 10 + 10). To assess 
space perception, the Position Discrimination and Number Location tests were 
administered. Each test stimulus in the Position Discrimination test consisted of two 
adjacent horizontal squares, one with a black dot (5mm) printed exactly in the centre 
and one with a black dot just „off‟ centre. In each of the 20 stimuli the „off‟ centre dot is in 
a different position within the square, in ten stimuli the centre dot is in the left square and 
in ten in the right square. JP was instructed that the task is to point to the dot that is in 
the centre and the number of correct choices was recorded. The ten test stimuli in the 
Number Location test consisted of two squares (62mm · 62mm), one above the other 
with a small gap between them. The top square contains randomly placed numbers (1–
9) and the bottom square a single black dot corresponding to the position of one of the 
numbers. The position of the dot is different in each of the stimulus cards and there are 
four different number arrays. JP was informed that the task is to identify the number that 
corresponds with the position of the dot on each trial. The ten test cards were presented 
and the number selected was noted and the total number of correct responses was 
recorded (maximum = 10) and used as a score.  
 
Investigation of face processing abilities 
Total, visual and verbal memory, forgetting, and visual-verbal and recall-
recognition discrepancies based on the Doors and People Test (Baddeley, Emslie, & 
Nimmo-Smith, 1994); unfamiliar face matching based on the Benton Face Discrimination 
Test (Benton, Hamsher, Varney & Spreen, 1983); perception of eye gaze direction 
based on Perrett‟s Gaze Direction Test (Young, Aggleton, Hellawell, Johnson, Broks, & 
Hanley, 1995); ability to recognise, name, and provide identifying information from 
photographs of faces based on the Famous Faces Test (Greene & Hodges, 1996); and 
facial expression recognition based on the Facial Expression and Emotion Stimulus Test 
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(FEEST) (Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer & Ekman, 2002) was investigated. 
Each of these tests will be described in turn.  
 
Doors and People Test  
The full battery of tests were administered in the following order: the People Test 
(to assess immediate verbal recall); the Doors Test (to assess visual recognition); the 
People Test (to assess delayed verbal recall); the Shapes Test (to assess immediate 
visual recall); the Names Test (to assess verbal recognition); and the Shapes Test (to 
assess delayed visual recall). The stimuli in the People Test comprised three high-
frequency and one low-frequency forename/surname pairs of differing syllabic length. 
Each name was paired with an occupation and presented as a caption to a coloured 
photograph. JP was instructed to learn the names of the four people and informed that 
she should concentrate on remembering the forename and surname. The stimuli in the 
Doors Test were coloured photographs of doors, from different types of buildings (e.g. 
houses, garages, sheds, barns, churches, public buildings), varying in country of origin, 
age and condition. There were 27 „target‟ doors and 81 „distractors‟. The target doors 
were mounted singly on a grey background. For the recognition set, each target was 
presented with three distractors in a 2 x 2 matrix, with the position of the target door in 
the array counterbalanced. Three of the target items were for practice and the remaining 
targets were in two sets of twelve, an easy set (A) and a harder set (B). The targets in 
each set were presented in random order and tested in a different order. The recognition 
test for the easier set was given before the harder test began. The examiner presented 
the 12 photographs from set A at 3-second intervals, giving a verbal label with each. JP 
was then asked to pick the target door from the recognition set (selection of four doors; 
the target and three distractors). The same procedure was followed for Set B. JP was 
then asked to recall the names of the four people presented previously in order to obtain 
a forgetting score. The stimuli for the Shape test were four line drawings of crosses. 
Each drawing was presented in black ink on a rectangular white card. The four cross 
shapes were potent, pommee, quadrate and Celtic, thus were varied systematically on 
three dimensions: overall shape (elongated or square), presence of features at the end 
of the arms, and presence of a feature at the intersection of the arms. The examiner 
presented the four drawings and informed JP that the task is to copy it. Three recall 
trials then followed. Scores for the three trials were taken and combined. The stimuli in 
the Names Test were forename/surname pairs. There were 27 „target‟ names and 81 
distractors. The target names were mounted singly on white card. For the recognition 
test the targets were each presented with three distractors (all of which shared the same 
forename) in a vertical list with the position of the target in the list counterbalanced. 
Three of the target items were for practice and had male forenames; the remaining 
targets comprised two sets of twelve, an easier set (A) which had female forenames, 
and a harder set (B) which had male forenames. The recognition test for the easier set 
was given prior to the harder set. Presentation order of targets was randomised and a 
different random order was used in the recognition test. Set A was presented to JP at 3-
second intervals and JP was instructed to read each one as it was presented. The same 
procedure for presentation and testing was administered for Set B. Correct responses 
were recorded to provide a score. Finally, JP was instructed to draw as many of the 
shapes as she could remember from the previous Shapes Test, to assess delayed 
visual recall.  
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Benton Face Discrimination Test  
The Benton Face Discrimination Test was given to assess unfamiliar face 
matching. In this test, JP was required to choose which of six photographs of unfamiliar 
faces are pictures of the same person as a simultaneously presented target face 
photograph. 22 items were given. The test included items involving choice of identical 
photographs, as well as transformations of orientation or lighting. Responses were 
recorded and pooled to give an overall total. Advantages of the Benton test are that it is 
well-standardized and quite demanding (Broks, et al., 1998).  
 
Perrett‟s Gaze Direction Test 
A forced-choice task was used to assess JP‟s ability to determine eye gaze 
direction. Pairs of photographs of the same person's face were presented alongside 
each other. For one-third of the pairs (six trials) both pictures were full-face photographs, 
for one-third (six trials) they were both facing 20 ° to the left, and for the remaining third 
of pairs (six trials) both faces were facing 20 ° to the right. In each pair, the eyes of the 
target face were oriented directly toward JP, and the non-target face was looking away 
to the left or right by 5 °, 10 ° or 20 °. The combination of six directions of gaze for the 
non-target faces (left and right directions of gaze at 5 °, 10 and 20 °) and three possible 
head orientations for both members of each pair (full-face, 20 ° left or 20 ° right) 
produced a total of 18 trials. On each of these, JP was asked to choose the photograph 
of the face that was looking directly toward her.  
 
Famous Faces Test 
Identification of familiar faces was assessed using 70 highly familiar faces 
(famous people). For each face, JP was asked to recognize, name and provide 
identifying information from photographs of faces.  The measures of performance 
involved the number of highly familiar faces recognized as familiar, the number named 
correctly and the level of correct detail given (1 point was given for vague but correct 
detail; 2 points were given when a detailed account of the famous person was provided). 
 
Facial Expression and Emotion Stimulus Test (FEEST) 
Recognition of facial expressions of emotion was examined using the Ekman 60 
Faces test and the Emotion Hexagon test. Both tests were run from software on FEEST 
CDROM.  In the Ekman 60 Faces test, JP viewed 60 photographs faces taken from the 
Ekman and Friesen (1976) series (10 faces were taken from this series; 6 female and 4 
male) one at a time. The face displayed one of the six basic emotions – anger, disgust, 
fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise, and was presented for 5 seconds. This was 
followed by a blank screen. JP was then required to decide which of the emotion names 
(anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise) best described the facial 
expression shown by clicking on the appropriate on-screen button with the mouse. 
There were 6 practice trials followed by 60 randomised test trials (10 for each of the six 
emotions), leading to an accuracy score out of a possible maximum of 60 correct 
choices. The Emotion Hexagon test was administered in order to test facial expression 
recognition with stimuli of graded difficulty. 30 computer-manipulated images of faces 
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from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) series were used to test recognition of basic 
emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise). The morphed images 
created examples of emotions that lie close to or more distant from the prototype 
expression. The computer software on the CDROM presented the morphed images in 
random order for 5 seconds each across one practice and 5 test blocks of 30 trials each. 
A blank screen followed the image and JP was asked to decide which of the emotion 
names (happiness, sadness, surprise, disgust, anger, and fear) best described the facial 
expression shown. Responses were recorded based on mouse clicks to on-screen 
buttons, and converted to scores out of a maximum of 120 for overall performance and 
scores out of 20 for recognition of the six emotions.  
 
Investigation of imagery abilities 
Subjective vividness of visual imagery based on the Vividness of Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire (VVIQ) (Marks, 1973); spontaneous use of imagery based on the 
Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS) (Reisberg, Pearson & Kosslyn, 2003); 
subjective vividness of auditory imagery based on the Bucknell Auditory Imagery 
Vividness Scale (Halpern, Zatorre, Bouffard & Johnson, 2004); and auditory imagery 
control based on the Bucknell Auditory Imagery Control Scale (Halpern et al., 2004) was 
investigated. Moreover, imagery abilities were studied through assessment of responses 
to high and low imagery questions (Eddy & Glass, 1981); and through use of the 
Animals Tails Test (Behrmann, Moscovitch & Winocur, 1994); Letter Form Tests (Weber 
& Castleman, 1970); Manikin Test (Ratcliff, 1979); Famous Face Feature Test (Zeman, 
Della Sala, Torrens, Gountouna, McGonigle & Logie, unpublished manuscript) and 
Facial Expression Feature Test (Zeman et al., unpublished manuscript). Each of these 
tests will be described in turn. 
 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) 
Participants completed the VVIQ. This is a brief 16-item questionnaire with a test-
retest reliability coefficient of 0.74 (n = 68), and a split-half reliability coefficient of 0.85 (n 
= 150) (Marks, 1973). Participants were required to summon an image for each item and 
rate its vividness along a five-point scale (with a 1 indicating „perfectly clear and as vivid 
as normal vision‟, a 2 „clear and reasonably vivid‟, a 3 „moderately clear and vivid‟ a 4 
„vague and dim‟ and a 5 „no image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of an 
object‟). Participants completed this once with their eyes open, and once with the eyes 
closed. Scores were calculated for eyes open, eyes closed and a total score was 
calculated. A high score on the questionnaire is indicative of little/no use of imagery 
(maximum score = 160) and a low score is indicative of good use of imagery (minimum 
score = 32).  
 
Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS) 
The SUIS is a brief 12-item questionnaire. The items were designed to measure 
(self-reported) spontaneous use of imagery, sample items include „If I am looking for 
new furniture in a store, I always visualize what the furniture would look like in particular 
places in my home‟ and „When I first hear a friend‟s voice, a visual image of him or her 
almost always come to mind‟. Participants were asked to read the items and to „indicate 
the degree to which each is appropriate for them‟, using a 1-5 scale (with a 5 indicating 
„completely appropriate‟, and a 1 „never appropriate‟). Thus a low score on this 
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questionnaire is indicative of little/no use of imagery (minimum score = 12) and a high 
score is indicative of high use of imagery (maximum score = 60).  
 
Bucknell Auditory Imagery Vividness Scale (Halpern, Zatorre, Bouffard & Johnson,2004) 
Participants read 14 items involving imagined auditory stimuli (voices, music, 
environmental sounds), and rated the vividness of the resulting imagery experience on a 
scale of one (no image present at all) to seven (as vivid as actual sound). Thus a low 
score on this questionnaire is indicative of little/no use of imagery (minimum score = 14) 
and a high score is indicative of good use of imagery (maximum score = 98).  
 
Bucknell Auditory Imagery Control Scale (Halpern, Zatorre, Bouffard & Johnson, 2004) 
Participants were required to read 14 items involving imagined auditory stimuli 
(voices, music, environmental sounds), for example, „consider driving in a car‟. There 
were 2 statements for each item („a‟ and „b‟) and participants were required to consider 
how easily they could change their image of the first sound to that of the second sound. 
For example, for the sample item: „consider driving in a car‟, part „a‟ involves considering 
„the sound of an upbeat rock song on the radio‟ and part „b‟ involves considering that 
„the song is now masked by the sound of the car coming to a screeching halt‟. 
Participants were instructed to “rate how easily you could make this change” on a scale 
of one (no image present at all) to seven (extremely easy to change the image). A low 
score indicated little/no use of imagery (minimum score = 14) and a high score indicated 
good use of imagery (maximum score = 98).  
 
High and Low Imagery Questions 
 Thirty-six critical sentences were used in a sentence verification task, selected 
from Eddy and Glass (1981). Eighteen sentences were high-imagery and eighteen were 
low-imagery. A sentence was rated high in imagery if an image was required to 
determine whether the sentence was true or false, and a sentence was rated as low in 
imagery if the sentence did not require an image to determine its truth value (Eddy & 
Glass, 1981). Nine sentences were high-imagery and true; nine were low-imagery and 
true; nine were high-imagery and false; and nine were low-imagery and false. The items 
were block randomised so that the 36 sentences were in 9 blocks of 4 items each. Each 
block had one high-imagery true sentence, one low-imagery true sentence, one high-
imagery false sentence, and one low-imagery false sentence. The sentences appeared 
consecutively on a screen and a timer started simultaneously with each sentence. JP 
was instructed to hit the key on the left of the keyboard marked” false” with a finger from 
her left hand when she thought the sentence to be false, and to hit the key on the right 
of the keyboard marked “true” with a finger from her right hand when she thought the 
sentence to be truthful. Pressing the keys terminated the timer. Responses and reaction 
times were recorded.  
 
Animals Tails Test  
JP was required to make judgements about whether animals have a long or short 
tail relative to its overall body length. A list of 40 animals was read aloud by the 
examiner and JP was asked to rate whether the animal in question has a long or short 
tail relative to their body size. Responses were recorded and used as a score and JP 
was timed.  
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Letter Form Tests 
JP completed two forms of this test; the first requiring judgements about whether 
letters have curved parts, and the second, requiring judgements about whether letters 
extend „below an imaginary line‟. The test stimuli in the first task were the 26 letters of 
the alphabet. The letters appeared in lower case, consecutively, and in random order. 
JP was required to rate whether “the upper case letter corresponding to each of the 
lower case letters has curved line segments”. Two practise items were used to explain 
the task. JP was asked to perform the task as accurately and as quickly as possible 
using mental images of the letters. The stimuli in the second task were the 26 letters of 
the alphabet. The letters appeared in upper case, consecutively, and in random order. 
JP was required to rate whether “the lower case letter corresponding to each of the 
upper case letters extends above or below imaginary lines”. Two practise items were 
used to explain the task. JP was asked to perform the task as accurately and as quickly 
as possible using mental images of the letters. 
 
Manikin Test  
 This task required mental rotation in space. The test stimuli was 32 pictures of 
manikins in four different orientations: A, B, C and D (A = facing forward in the 
anatomical position; B = facing away in the anatomical position; C = facing forward and 
upside down; D = facing away and upside down). For each orientation, a black disc 
marked the right hand in half of the stimuli and the left hand in the other half. Stimuli 
were presented in a random order. JP was required to say, on each trail, which of the 
manikin‟s hands was marked with the black disc. At the beginning of the test, JP was 
shown a manikin in orientation A (but without either hand being marked) and her 
attention was drawn to the hair, ears and face. JP was informed that she would see a 
series of manikins, and that the manikin might be facing her (in which case the face will 
be visible), or might have his back to her (in which case the hair and ears will be visible); 
and that the manikin might be the right way up or upside down. JP was then informed 
that one of the hands of each figure would be marked with a black disc and that she was 
to say “right” or “left” as soon as she had decided which hand was marked. Two practice 
trials were given, any errors corrected, and the task explained again if necessary. To 
ensure that JP used the words “right” and “left” appropriately, 24 additional trials were 
given in which the stimuli were simply pairs of circles, one white and one black, with a 
vertical line between them. JP was required to say “right” or “left” depending on the side 
on which the black circle appeared. Twelve of these trials were given before the main 
test and twelve afterwards. All responses were recorded.  
 
Famous Face Feature Test 
This task required JP to make judgments about visual details of 12 familiar faces, 
firstly, using imagery, and secondly, with a photograph in view. To begin with, JP was 
asked for some identifying information for each of the 12 familiar faces to establish 
familiarity. After asking for this information, the examiner asked six questions about each 
of the familiar faces, all of which required a yes/no response. Responses and the total 
length of time taken to answer the questions were recorded. Subsequently, the same 
questions were asked but with a photograph of the famous person in view. Responses 
and the total length of time taken to answer the questions were recorded.  
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Facial Expression Feature Test 
This task required JP to make judgments about visual features associated with 
six facial expressions of basic emotions (sadness, surprise, happiness, anger, disgust 
and fear). The examiner asked JP six questions about the visual features associated 
with each of the six facial expressions, all of which required a yes/no response.  
Responses and the total length of time taken to answer the questions were recorded.  
Results 
 
 Background Neuropsychological Information 
Background neuropsychological information for JP is given in Table 1. This 
shows handedness, estimated premorbid IQs, performance of the Wechsler Memory 
Scale (Third Edition) and BIRT Memory and Information Processing Battery and 
assessments of shape, object and space perception. The performance of JP was 
compared on relevant measures with the performance of 20 control participants aged 
38–55 years. This control group was well matched to JP on sex (female), handedness 
(JP = 22/22 right-handed; control mean = 21.25 right-handed, SD = 1.59), age (JP = 45 
years; control mean = 46.25 years, SD = 5.08), and on predicted IQ (based on the 
NART) (JP = 115; control mean = 109.90, SD = 5.18). Control data for handedness and 
IQ is taken from this group.  Control data for the other tests are taken from the test‟s 
norms (see test references for origins of normative data). 
 
Table 1 shows that JP is right handed and of above-average intelligence. 
Moreover, JP‟s scores on the two subtests of the Wechsler Memory Scale – III reveal 
that she has some problems with visually presented information compared to orally 
presented information. Specifically, although JP had more correct (53.1%) than incorrect 
(46.9%) responses on the spatial span task of the Wechsler Memory Scale – III (17 out 
of 32 correct), a binomial test failed to reject the hypothesis that this was due to chance: 
Exact p = .860 (two tailed). Moreover, although JP had more correct (83.3%) than 
incorrect (16.7%) responses on the digit span task of the Wechsler Memory Scale – III 
(25 out of 30 correct), a binomial test rejected the hypothesis that this was due to 
chance: Exact p = .001 (two tailed). The probability that JP scored 25 out of 30 correct 
on the Digit Span Task simply due to chance is less than .01%. Further, it can be seen 
that JP‟s performance of the BIRT Memory and Information Processing Battery and 
Visual and Object Space Perception Battery was in the normal range. 
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Table 1 Background neuropsychological information for JP, and means and SDs for control 
subjects of comparable sex, handedness age and IQ. 
 
 
 
JP Controls 
  Mean SD 
Handedness test    
   Edinburgh Handedness 
   Inventory (/22) 
22 
(right handed) 
21.25 
(right handed) 
1.59 
    
WAIS-R Full Scale IQ 115 109.90 5.18 
WAIS-R Verbal IQ 113 108.25 4.82 
WAIS-R Performance IQ 114 109.35 4.70 
    
Wechsler Memory Scale – III    
   Spatial Span (/32) 17 NT NT 
   Digit Span (/30) 25 NT NT 
    
BIRT Memory and Information 
Processing Battery 
   
Story recall:    
   Immediate (/60) 25 29.2 9.1 
   Delayed (/60) 19 25.3 9.0 
   Retained % 76 86.5 15.9 
Figure recall    
   Copy % 100 96.1 5.8 
   Immediate % 73.75 77.2 15.0 
   Delayed % 56.25 64.2 25.2 
   Retained % 76.27 82.1 28.4 
    
VOSP: Shape Detection       
   Screening Test (/20) 20 19.92 0.33 
    
VOSP: Object perception    
   Silhouettes (/30) 23 23.1 4.1 
   Progressive Silhouettes (/20) 13 9.8 2.4 
       
VOSP: Space perception    
   Position Discrimination (/20) 20 19.7 0.8 
   Number Location (/10) 10 9.4 1.1 
NT indicates not tested with this task 
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Face processing abilities 
JP‟s face processing abilities are summarized in Table 2. This shows total, visual 
and verbal memory, forgetting, and visual-verbal and recall-recognition discrepancies, 
unfamiliar face matching, perception of eye gaze direction, ability to recognise, name, 
and provide identifying information from photographs of famous faces and facial 
expression recognition. Control data for unfamiliar face matching and ability to 
recognise, name, and provide identifying information from photographs of faces is taken 
from the group of 20 control participants. Control data for total, visual and verbal 
memory, forgetting, and visual-verbal and recall-recognition discrepancies, perception of 
eye gaze direction and facial expression recognition is taken from test norms (see test 
references for origins of normative data). 
 
Table 2 shows that JP was within the normal range in terms of overall episodic 
memory performance. However, when this score is broken down, it can be see that JP is 
below the range of normal control scores on visual memory tests (z = -2.18, P< 0.05) 
and slightly above-average on verbal memory tests (0.39 SDs above control mean). 
Further, it can be seen that JP‟s visual-verbal discrepancy is below the normal range (z 
= -2.24, P< 0.05). Moreover, Table 2 shows that JP‟s accuracy score on the Benton 
Face Discrimination Test was severely impaired (23 out of 54 correct, z = -2.56, P< 
0.01) and that JP was impaired on the Perrett‟s Gaze Direction Test (15 out of 18 
correct, z = -2.19, P< 0.05). JP made no errors when the gaze direction of the non-target 
face deviated by 10° (six out of six correct) and 20° (six out of six correct), but she 
performed less well with 5° deviations (three out of six correct). Table 2 further shows 
that JP‟s score on the Famous Faces Test was significantly impaired (45 out of a 
possible 280, z = -3.83, P< 0.001). JP was significantly impaired at famous face 
recognition (19 out of 70 identified, z = -4.49, P< 0.001), at naming them (12 out of 70 
named, z = -2.91, P< 0.01) and at giving identifying information for them (14 out of 140, 
z = -3.21, P< 0.001). Finally, it can be seen that JP‟s performance of the Ekman 60 
Faces test and Emotion Hexagon Test was within the normal range. 
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Table 2 JP’s performance of face processing tasks, and means and SDs for control subjects of 
comparable sex, handedness age and IQ. 
 
 
 
JP Controls 
  Mean SD 
Doors and People    
   Total Memory 6 9.2 3.2 
   Combined Visual 4* 10.1 2.8 
   Combined Verbal  10 8.7 3.3 
   Overall Forgetting 4 9.4 3.3 
   Visual-Verbal Discrepancy 7* 10.8 1.7 
   Recall-Recognition Discrepancy 10 9.0 1.7 
    
Benton Face Discrimination Test 
(/54) 
23** 39.20 6.32 
       
Perrett‟s Gaze Direction Test (/18) 15* 16.95 0.89 
    
Famous Faces Test    
   Recognized as “famous” (/70) 19*** 48.65 6.60 
   Named (/70) 12** 31.70 6.78 
   Identifying Information (/140) 14*** 61.05 14.65 
   Total (/280) 45*** 141.30 25.13 
    
Facial Expression of Emotions    
Ekman 60 Faces Test    
   Anger (/10) 8 7.86 1.90 
   Disgust (/10) 10 8.59 1.62 
   Fear (/10) 6 7.19 2.03 
   Happiness (/10) 10 9.87 0.42 
   Sadness (/10) 9 8.33 1.66 
   Surprise (/10) 10 8.55 1.44 
   Total (/60) 53 50.64 5.04 
    
Emotion Hexagon Test    
   Anger (/20) 19 17.84 2.80 
   Disgust (/20) 20 18.01 3.65 
   Fear (/20) 20 16.56 3.76 
   Happiness (/20) 20 19.74 0.80 
   Sadness (/20) 20 18.38 3.42 
   Surprise (/20) 17 17.69 2.16 
   Total (/120) 116 107.97 9.51 
Asterisked scores are significantly impaired in comparison to the performance of 
controls: *z> 1.65, P<0.05; **z> 2.33, P<0.01; ***z> 3.10, P<0.001. 
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Imagery abilities 
JP‟s imagery abilities are summarized in Table 3. This shows subjective vividness 
of visual imagery, spontaneous use of imagery, subjective vividness of auditory imagery, 
auditory imagery control and imagery abilities, based on responses to High and Low 
Imagery Questions and performance of the Animals Tails Test, Letter Form Tests, 
Manikin Test, Famous Face Feature Test and Facial Expression Feature Test. Control 
data for subjective vividness of visual imagery, spontaneous use of imagery, subjective 
vividness of auditory imagery and auditory imagery control is taken from the group of 20 
control participants. 
 
Table 3 Visual Imagery Abilities of JP, and means and SDs for control subjects of comparable 
sex, handedness age and IQ. 
 
 
 
JP Controls 
  Mean SD 
Subjective vividness of Visual Imagery (VVIQ) 134** 72.90 21.28 
Spontaneous Use of Imagery (SUIS) 14** 41.00 9.50 
Subjective vividness of Auditory Imagery  55 59.95 12.76 
Auditory Imagery Control 61 70.55 15.34 
    
Imagery Tests    
High and Low Imagery Questions    
   High Imagery (/18) 8 NT NT 
   Low Imagery (/18) 8 NT NT 
Animals Tails Test (/40) 32 NT NT 
Letter Form Test     
   Curved line segments (/26) 26 NT NT 
   Extend above/below imaginary lines (/26)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    25 NT NT
Manikin Test (/32) 19 NT NT 
Famous face feature Test I (/48) 29 NT NT 
   With photograph in view II (/48) 34 NT NT 
Facial Expression feature Test (/36)  17 NT NT 
Asterisked scores are significantly impaired in comparison to the performance of 
controls: *z> 1.65, P<0.05; **z> 2.33, P<0.01; ***z> 3.10, P<0.001. 
NT indicates not tested with this task 
 
Table 3 shows that JP‟s performance of the VVIQ was significantly below that of 
controls (z = 2.87, P<0.01) and that her performance of the SUIS was also significantly 
below that of controls (z = 2.87, P<0.01). Further, it can be seen that JP‟s performance 
of the Bucknell Auditory Imagery Vividness Scale and Bucknell Auditory Imagery Control 
Scale was in the normal range.  
With regard to imagery abilities, table 3 shows that JP had more incorrect (55.6%) 
than correct (44.4%) responses to high imagery questions (8 out of 18 correct), a 
binomial test failed to reject the hypothesis that this was due to chance: Exact p = .815 
(two tailed). JP took 1:54 minutes in total to answer all high imagery questions. Further, 
table 3 shows that JP had more incorrect (55.6%) than correct (44.4%) responses to low 
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imagery questions, again, a binomial test failed to reject the hypothesis that this was due 
to chance: Exact p = .815 (two tailed). JP took 2:06 minutes in total to answer all low 
imagery questions. Moreover, table 3 shows that JP had more correct (80%) than 
incorrect (20%) responses on the Animals Tails Test (32 out of 40 correct), a binomial 
test rejected the hypothesis that this was due to chance: Exact p = .001 (two tailed). 
Thus the probability that this result was simply due to chance is less than .01%. JP took 
2:45 minutes in total to complete the Animals Tails Test. Table 3 further reveals that JP 
was unimpaired at the two Letter Form Tests; she preformed at ceiling on the test 
requiring judgements about whether letters have curved parts (26 out of 26 correct, 
100%), a binomial test rejected the hypothesis that this was due to chance: Exact p = 
.001 (two tailed), and close to ceiling on the test requiring judgements about whether 
letters extend „below an imaginary line‟ (25 out of 26 correct, 96.2%), a binomial test 
rejected the hypothesis that this was due to chance: Exact p = .001 (two tailed). Indeed, 
the probability that these results were simply due to chance is less than .01%. With 
regard to the Manikin Test, although JP had more correct (59.4%) than incorrect 
(40.6%) responses (19 out of 32 correct), a binomial test failed to reject the hypothesis 
that this was due to chance: Exact p = .377 (two tailed). JP made no errors on the 
left/right identification task prior to the Manikin Test (12 out of 12 correct, 100%) and 
after (12 out of 12 correct, 100%). Of the four different orientations (A, B, C and D), JP 
achieved 5 out of 8 correct in orientation A (manikin facing forward in the anatomical 
position); 6 out of 8 correct in orientation B (manikin facing away in the anatomical 
position); 2 out of 8 correct in orientation C (manikin facing forward and upside down); 
and 6 out of 8 correct in orientation D (manikin facing away and upside down). Finally, 
with regard to the Famous Face Feature Test, although JP had more correct (60.4%) 
than incorrect (39.6%) responses (29 out of 48 correct), a binomial test failed to reject 
the hypothesis that this was due to chance: Exact p = .193 (two tailed). JP took 4:36 
minutes in total to complete the Famous Face Feature Test. When a photograph of the 
famous face was in view, JP had more correct (70.8%) than incorrect (29.2%) 
responses (34 out of 48 correct), a binomial test rejected the hypothesis that that this 
was due to chance: Exact p = .006 (two tailed). Thus the probability that this result was 
simply due to chance is less than 1%. JP took 3:44 minutes in total to complete the 
Famous Face Feature Test with a photograph in view. Finally,  table 3 shows that JP 
had more incorrect (52.8%) than correct (47.2%) responses on the Facial Expression 
Feature Test (17 out of 36 correct), a binomial test failed to reject the hypothesis that 
this was due to chance: Exact p = .868 (two tailed). JP took 3:30 minutes in total to 
complete the Facial Expression Feature Test. Thus, to summarize, binomial testing 
rejected the hypotheses that JP‟s performance of the Animals Tails Test, Letter Form 
Tests and Famous Feature test when a photograph of the famous person was in view 
was due to chance; moreover, it failed to reject the hypotheses that JP‟s performance of 
the sentence verification, Manikin, Famous Face Feature and Facial Expression Feature 
tests were due to chance. 
 
Discussion 
JP is of above-average intelligence, thus there is no ground for thinking that she 
has any general intellectual impairment. Moreover, she performed within the normal 
range on the Visual and Object Space Perception Battery, thus indicating that she has 
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no problems affecting visual and spatial abilities. Her performance of the BIRT Memory 
and Information Processing Battery and overall episodic memory performance on the 
Doors and People Test was in the normal range, indicating that she has little problems 
affecting memory. Having said that, JP‟s performance of the Wechsler Memory Scale – 
III does indicates that she has a greater capacity to remember and manipulate orally 
presented information in short-term memory storage compared to visually presented 
information. Moreover, her performance of the Doors and People Test supports this 
conclusion, as JP performed significantly below the normal range on visual memory 
tests compared to verbal memory tests, in which she scored slightly above average. 
Taken together, this indicates that JP has a minor generalized difficulty with visual 
recognition. Indeed, JP‟s above average performance on the verbal memory tests of the 
Doors and People Test may be explained as overcompensation for poor visual memory.
 With regards to specific face processing tests, JP was significantly impaired on 
unfamiliar face matching, perception of eye gaze and famous face recognition, and was 
in the normal range for facial expression recognition. Her impaired performance of the 
Benton Face Discrimination Test indicates that JP has poor perception of the face‟s 
physical structure. Moreover, her interpretation of eye gaze direction was defective; 
taken together, these findings are indicative that JP has a generalized deficit in face 
perception. Moreover, JP performed very poorly on all aspects of the Famous Faces 
Test, which is indicative of a selective deficit of face memory. JP‟s normal performance 
on the verbal tests of the Doors and People Test (Names and People Tests) confirm that 
her difficulty in recognizing faces is not due to a generalized loss of semantic information 
about people, but rather to a problem in accessing knowledge via face perception. 
Interestingly, although JP performed significantly below the normal range on the 
Perrett‟s Gaze Direction Test, she only made errors with 5° deviations. This is similar to 
the performance pattern of controls, who similarly only made errors with 5° deviations 
(Young et al., 1995). This similar response pattern suggests that JP may possess some 
ability to understand gaze. Moreover, JP reported that she had no difficulty reading 
facial expressions of emotion; indeed her performance of the FEEST supported this 
claim as JP performed within the normal range on both the Ekman 60 Faces Test and 
the Emotion Hexagon Test. This suggests that JP is able to read social signals from the 
face. 
Thus, with regard to face processing, the investigation has confirmed the 
hypothesis that JP would perform poorly on tests of face processing; specifically it has 
highlighted JP‟s problems in matching unfamiliar faces, understanding gaze, and in 
recognition of famous faces. In contrast, ability to understand facial expression was 
found to be well preserved. It can be said that JP‟s difficulties are of the “prosopagnosic” 
type: she has no general intellectual impairment, no problems affecting visual and 
spatial abilities, has little problems affecting overall memory and could recognize people 
from their names. However, her face perception and recognition deficits were severe. 
JP‟s problems did not affect all face processing tasks, but were selective to certain 
aspects of face processing; as such, the findings are consistent with the cognitive and 
network models of face processing as a distinction was found between processes 
involved in the recognition of identity and those involved in the recognition of expression. 
JP‟s Prosopagnosia is of the apperceptive rather than the associative type as face 
perception did not function normally; her impaired performance of the Benton Face 
Discrimination Test shows that she has poor perception of the face‟s physical structure; 
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her impaired performance of the Perrett‟s Gaze Direction Test shows that she has poor 
perception of eye gaze; and her impaired performance of the Famous Faces Test shows 
that JP is unable to form a percept of famous faces thus is unable to form facial 
memories.  
Furthermore, with regard to visual mental imagery, the investigation has 
confirmed the hypothesis that JP would perform poorly on reports and tests of visual 
imagery. Specifically, JP rated her subjective vividness of visual imagery and 
spontaneous use of imagery as extremely poor; indeed her results of the VVIQ and 
SUIS were significantly different to control participants. However, JP rated subjective 
vividness of auditory imagery and auditory imagery control within the normal range. 
Given the finding that JP has a greater capacity to remember and manipulate orally 
presented information compared to visually presented information, this finding is 
consistent with the notion of representational commonality, as a parallelism is evident in 
JP‟s deficits. 
With regard to the standard tests of visual imagery, it was confirmed that JP‟s 
scores on the Animals Tails and Letter Form Tests were not due to chance; in contrast, 
chance remained as a possible explanation for JP‟s performance of the mental rotation 
in space, sentence verification and face imagery tasks. The reasons for JP‟s seemingly 
intact ability to judge in her mind‟s eye a previously encoded animal or letter remain 
unclear; it may be due to image generation, or it may be that performance was based on 
propositional processes and tacit knowledge (Pylyshyn, 1973; 2002) of animal body 
parts and shapes of upper and lower case letters. Moreover, JP‟s performance of the 
Manikin Test is indicative of poor use of mental rotation (the left/right identification tasks 
ensured that poor performance was not due to misuse of the words “right” and “left”); of 
the four different orientations (A, B, C and D), orientation C (manikin facing forward and 
upside down) required the largest mental rotation to identify the location of the black disc 
and orientation B (manikin facing away in the anatomical position) should have required 
no mental rotation. Indeed, JP correctly identified the location of the black disc in 
orientation B considerably more than in orientation C, thus suggesting that she was not 
capable of performing mental rotation. What‟s more, JP‟s scores on the sentence 
verification test are indicative of problems both rating sentences that require imagery to 
determine its truth value, and at rating sentences that do not require imagery to 
determine its truth value. Moreover, JP took longer in total to complete the low imagery 
questions compared to the high imagery questions. High imagery true sentences, high 
imagery false sentences, low imagery true sentences and low imagery false sentences 
were randomly intermixed throughout the task, thus represented constant switches of 
use of and no use of imagery. It is possible that this fact could account for JP‟s poor 
accuracy across all conditions of this experiment, because she may have adopted a 
strategy of attempting mental imagery on every trial, even when this was unnecessary. 
Alternative explanations of JP‟s performance of the sentence verification test include 
that she was fatigued and therefore completing the task as quickly as possible, that she 
did not understand the nature of the task, or that she found the task discomforting thus 
was paying little attention; these explanations seem unlikely however, as JP reported 
that she was keen to establish the nature and specificity of her problems. Rather than 
risk skewing the results, it seems likely that her performance was the consequence of 
confused, maladaptive or dysfunctional imagery. Finally, JP performed poorly when 
making judgments about visual details of familiar faces and about visual features 
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associated with facial expressions of basic emotions. In contrast to patient LH (Levine et 
al., 1985), who showed a similarity in the pattern of deficit between visual imagery and 
vision, JP‟s imagery problems seems to extend beyond imagery for faces. A further 
complication is that JP was able to recognize facial expressions of emotion when 
responding to stimulus in the here and now (as shown by her performance of the 
FEEST), but was unable to make judgments about the visual details of visual features 
associated with facial expressions of basic emotions when using visual imagery. Farah 
(1984) distinguished between „visual imagery generation deficits‟, causing impairment 
on measures of visual imagery without impairment on tests of perception; deficits of 
long-term visual memory, causing parallel impairments of recognition and imagery; and 
„inspection process deficits‟, reflecting a lower level visual disorder impairing description, 
recognition and imagery (Zeman et al., unpublished manuscript). Although both patient 
LH and JP provide examples of deficits of long-term visual memory, JP‟s deficit is rather 
more complex given her ability to recognize facial expressions of emotion and her 
apparent inability to perform mental rotation in space and her performance of the 
sentence verification task. Thus JP appears to have problems with the generation 
process as well as with long-term visual memory. Testing perception of non-face stimuli 
would provide a more detailed insight into JP‟s imagery problem. Testing JP using the 
famous buildings tests (i.e. the Famous Buildings Test and Graded Buildings Test) 
would assess whether JP‟s difficulty in recognizing famous faces is specific to faces. 
Moreover, this would provide a more detailed account of JP‟s recognition difficulties and 
provide expansion to the finding that JP has a minor generalized difficulty with visual 
recognition.  
Thus, with regard to visual imagery, the investigation lends support to the notion 
that different strategies may be adopted when performing imagery tasks. Indeed Zeman 
et al., (unpublished manuscript) suggested that a mental imagery strategy or a 
propositional strategy may be adopted depending on the task and the effectiveness with 
which each strategy can be used. For example, mental imagery may be useful when 
tacit knowledge is insufficient and tacit knowledge may be useful when mental imagery 
is insufficient. Thus, it is likely that JP adopted different strategies to perform the visual 
imagery tests; when she attempted to use imagery (on the mental rotation in space, 
sentence verification and face imagery tasks) her task performance was poor, however, 
when she was able to rely on propositional processes and tacit knowledge her 
performance was much better. Obtaining control data for the standard tests of visual 
imagery would allow for clarification of whether JP‟s adoption of different cognitive 
strategies was normal, or whether it was the result of her problematic visual imagery.  
Moreover, given that the current study represents a single-case experimental 
design, there is a general concern of external validity. Despite the fact that this problem 
is mitigated to some extent by the fact that Prosopagnosia and visual imagery deficits 
have been demonstrated in several other single-case experimental investigations, it 
remains as a concern; thus, in order to address this issue it would be useful to conduct 
the investigation on more than one participant reporting difficulties with face recognition 
and the experience of visual mental imagery. 
It has been noted that the findings from the present are consistent with the 
cognitive and network models of face processing as a distinction was found between 
processes involved in the recognition of identity and those involved in the recognition of 
expression. Moreover, the findings have highlighted JP‟s problems with image 
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generation and with long-term visual memory. To support the findings, it would be useful 
to investigate JP‟s face processing and visual imagery using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) as this would shed some light on whether JP‟s behavioural 
impairments can be traced to any possible alteration in neural substrate. Specifically, 
examining the pattern of fMRI activation in the fusiform gyrus (FFA) and in other ventral 
occipito-temporal areas, in response to faces, buildings, and other objects would show 
whether JP exhibits normal or differentiable face and object related fMRI activation 
patterns relative to control subjects. Moreover, given JP‟s problems with image 
generation and with long-term visual memory, examining her brain activation during 
attempted visual imagery would show whether she has a normal or abnormal pattern of 
brain activation when generating mental images. Also, to examine the structural 
connectivity disruption hypothesis, it would be useful to test JP using diffusion tensor 
imaging and tractography. This would shed some light on the structural integrity of her 
ILF and IFOF and thus whether her Congenital Prosopagnosia is the result of impaired 
connectivity linking the core regions with the extended regions of the face processing 
circuit. 
Finally, JP reported that a family member (her Father) has also reported 
difficulties with the recognition of faces. Given that the familial component in Congenital 
Prosopagnosia is of great interest and that “studies of the genetic predisposition and 
mechanism will allow us to start building bridges between behaviour and cortical 
development” (Behrmann & Avidan, 2005, p. 186), conducting a genetic investigation 
has the potential to shed some light on Congenital Prosopagnosia; of specific interest is 
whether it is compatible with autosomal dominant inheritance. 
The investigation has acknowledged the effects of impaired face processing and 
visual imagery on case JP, and has confirmed the hypothesis that JP would perform 
poorly on tests of face processing and on reports and tests of visual imagery. JP‟s 
problems did not affect all face processing tasks, but were selective to certain aspects of 
face processing; specifically, she impaired on unfamiliar face matching, perception of 
eye gaze and famous face recognition, and was in the normal range for facial 
expression recognition. This is of the “prosopagnosic” type given that JP has no general 
intellectual impairment, no problems affecting visual and spatial abilities, has little 
problems affecting overall memory and could recognize people from their names. 
Moreover, with regard to reports of visual imagery, JP rated her subjective vividness of 
visual imagery and spontaneous use of imagery as extremely poor and her subjective 
vividness of auditory imagery and auditory imagery control within the normal range. On 
the standard tests of visual imagery, it is likely that JP adopted different strategies; when 
she attempted to use imagery (on the mental rotation in space, sentence verification and 
face imagery tasks) her task performance was poor, however, when she was able to rely 
on propositional processes and tacit knowledge her performance was much better, as 
shown by her performance of the Animal Tails and Letter Forms tests. To support the 
behavioural findings, it has been suggested that JP undergoes fMRI to shed some light 
on whether her behavioural impairments can be traced to any possible alteration in 
neural substrate. It would be useful to know whether JP exhibits normal or differentiable 
face and object related fMRI activation patterns relative to control subjects; moreover, 
whether she has a normal or abnormal pattern of brain activation when generating 
mental images.  This would shed some light on whether she adopts a different cognitive 
strategy from controls when performing imagery tasks. Also, to examine the structural 
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connectivity disruption hypothesis, it would be useful to test JP using diffusion tensor 
imaging and tractography to investigate whether her Congenital Prosopagnosia is the 
result of impaired connectivity linking the core regions with the extended regions of the 
face processing circuit. This would not only expand our understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying Congenital Prosopagnosia, but would also mark a dramatic 
breakthrough in our understanding of face perception more generally. 
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